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Abstract
Many international business (IB) studies have used foreign direct investment
(FDI) stocks to measure the aggregate value-adding activity of multinational
enterprises (MNE) affiliates in host countries. We argue that FDI stocks are a
biased measure of that activity, because the degree to which they overestimate
or underestimate affiliate activity varies systematically with host-country
characteristics. First, most FDI into countries that serve as tax havens generate
no actual productive activity; thus FDI stocks in such countries overestimate
affiliate activity. Second, FDI stocks do not include locally raised external funds,
funds widely used in countries with well-developed financial markets or volatile
exchange rates, resulting in an underestimation of affiliate activity in such
countries. Finally, the extent to which FDI translates into affiliate activity
increases with affiliate labor productivity, so in countries where labor is more
productive, FDI stocks also result in an underestimation of affiliate activity.
We test these hypotheses by first regressing affiliate value-added and affiliate
sales on FDI stocks to calculate a country-specific mismatch, and then by
regressing this mismatch on a host country’s tax haven status, level of financial
market development, exchange rate volatility, and affiliate labor productivity.
All hypotheses are supported, implying that FDI stocks are a biased measure of
MNE affiliate activity, and hence that the results of FDI-data-based studies of
such activity need to be reconsidered.
Journal of International Business Studies (2010) 1–16. doi:10.1057/jibs.2010.29
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INTRODUCTION
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are firms that own value-adding
activities in more than one country, and are hence central to
international business (IB). While many IB studies have examined
the location and geographic distribution of such activities at the
level of individual MNEs (e.g., Davidson, 1980; Henisz & Delios,
2001), a significant number of them have taken the value-adding
activity performed by all MNE affiliates in a country as their level of
analysis. Between them these studies have investigated:
(1) how the foreign value-adding activities of MNEs from a given
home country are distributed across host countries (e.g.,
Dunning, 1980, 1993; Dunning, Fujita, & Yakova, 2007);
(2) how such cross-country distribution is affected by home and
host-country characteristics (e.g., Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu,
Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Grosse & Trevino, 1996; Habib &
Zurawicki, 2002; Sethi, Guisinger, Phelan, & Berg, 2003); and
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www.jibs.net(3) how MNE affiliate activity affects various
aspects of host-country development (e.g.,
Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Li & Liu, 2005).
Most of these country-level studies have mea-
sured the total amount of value-adding activity
performed by MNE affiliates in a host country by
the aggregate stock of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in that country, and changes in such activity
by aggregate FDI inflows. Presumably they have
done so because there are readily available home-
to-host FDI stock and flow data, whereas home-to-
host data on actual value-adding activity by MNE
affiliates are available only for a few developed
home countries.
1 For instance, in his often-cited
book Multinational enterprise and the global economy,
Dunning relies heavily on FDI stocks and flows to
study ‘‘the extent and pattern of the global
activities of MNEs’’ (1993: 14). In a later study
(Dunning et al., 2007), he and his colleagues use
such FDI data to investigate Rugman and Verbeke’s
(2004) finding that most MNEs concentrate their
value-adding activities in their home region. Like-
wise, Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol (2008) measure
increases in market-seeking and resource-exploiting
activities of MNE affiliates in a host country by FDI
flows to that country in market-seeking and
resource-exploiting industries.
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Although many studies have relied on them, FDI
stocks do not adequately measure the value-adding
activity of MNE affiliates in a host country, nor do
FDI flows accurately measure changes in such
activity. What FDI stocks and flows do capture is
the net financial capital that MNE parents have
provided to their host-country-based affiliates, and
the retained earnings of these affiliates, and that
capital need not be used to generate value-adding
MNE affiliate activity. As Fujita, the Chief of the
Investment Trends Section at UNCTAD that pub-
lishes FDI data, writes:
It should be emphasized that FDI is a BoP [Balance of
Payments] concept used to measure cross-border financial
flows. It does not measure the true extent or use of
investment (in buildings, land, machinery, equipment) by
foreign investors y Indeed, while the concepts and
definitions of BoP and FDI should be consistent with
international standards y they offer limited guidance
regarding the real economic role played by foreign affiliates
in a host economy. (Fujita, 2007: 4)
While it is true that a few other scholars have also
acknowledged that FDI stocks are a noisy measure
of the amount of value-adding MNE affiliate
activity in host countries (Dunning & Lundan,
2008; Lipsey, 2007), we argue that the problem is
more severe than that, because there are several
factors that, far from just adding noise, tend to bias
FDI stocks as a measure of total MNE affiliate
activity. First, not all FDI into a host country is used
to generate affiliate value-added there. As some
scholars have acknowledged (Lipsey, 2007), tax
havens, in particular, receive huge FDI inflows
and have large inward FDI stocks, but these flows
and stocks do not generate value-adding MNE
affiliate activity there. We therefore hypothesize
that FDI stocks overestimate actual MNE affiliate
activity in tax havens relative to non tax-havens.
Second, in addition to FDI there are other factors
that contribute to value-adding MNE affiliate
activity. Specifically, FDI figures include only the
equity and loans that originate from MNE parents
and the retained earnings of affiliates: thus they do
not include the substantial volume of funds raised
by MNEs from external host-country sources.
Indeed, the extent to which MNE affiliate activity
is financed with such locally raised external funds is
likely to be greater in host countries with larger
stock and bond markets, a more competitive
banking sector, lower interest rates, and a more
volatile exchange rate. This leads us to hypothesize
that FDI stocks underestimate actual MNE affiliate
activity to a greater extent in such countries.
Moreover, FDI is a financial input, and hence does
not capture how productively it will be used by
MNE affiliates to generate output. We would expect
the productivity of the factors of production that
may be purchased with this financial input,
especially labor, to vary systematically across host
countries, with a given amount of FDI generating
more value-added in countries where employees
of MNE affiliates are more productive. The extent
to which inward FDI stocks underestimate affiliate
value-added should therefore also be greater in
countries that have more productive MNE affiliates.
To test these hypotheses, we first regress the
aggregate value-added and sales of US foreign
affiliates in a specific country and year on the US
FDI stock in that country and year. The regression
coefficients thus obtained indicate how much
the FDI stock for each host-country–year combina-
tion over- or underestimates affiliate value-added
and sales. We then regress these coefficients on the
tax haven status of a host country, the size of its
stock and bond markets, the competitiveness of
its banking sector, its prevailing interest rate, its
exchange rate volatility, and the labor productivity
of the MNE affiliates that it hosts. In line with our
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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actual MNE affiliate activity to a greater extent in
countries that are tax havens, and underestimate
it to a greater extent in countries with more
developed capital markets, more volatile exchange
rates, and higher affiliate labor productivity. Thus,
we find that the mismatch between FDI stocks
and actual MNE affiliate activity is host-country-
specific, meaning that FDI stocks are a biased
measure of such activity.
These findings make it clear that it is risky to infer
differences in MNE affiliate activity across countries
based on differences in their inward FDI stocks,
because the cross-country distribution of inward
FDI stocks gives a biased picture of how actual
MNE value-adding activity is distributed across host
countries. Our findings also show that prior studies
that have used country-level FDI data to identify
the determinants and consequences of host-country
MNE affiliate activity have used a biased dependent
and independent variable, respectively, and hence
may have obtained biased results. Hence they
suggest that, to gain more insight into the distribu-
tion, determinants, and consequences of country-
level MNE affiliate activity, we should rely less on
FDI data and more on affiliate value-added and
sales data.
WHAT DOES FDI REALLY MEASURE?
FDI is part of the capital account of a country’s
balance of payments, which records its financial
transactions with other countries. FDI is universally
defined as
an investment involving a long-term relationship and
reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity
in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enter-
prise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than
that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate
enterprise or foreign affiliate). FDI implies that the investor
exerts a significant degree of influence on the management
of the enterprise resident in the other economy. Such
investment involves both the initial transaction between
the two entities and all subsequent transactions between
them and among foreign affiliates, both incorporated and
unincorporated. (UNCTAD, 2006: 293; also see IMF, 1993;
OECD, 1996)
FDI flows are cross-border flows of financial
capital that usually measure the difference between
the funds that MNE parents provided to their
foreign affiliates and the funds that foreign affili-
ates provided to their parents in a given year
(UNCTAD, 2006). They have three components:
equity capital transactions, reinvested earnings,
and intra-company debt transactions. Equity
capital transactions are purchases and sales by
parents of the shares of enterprises registered in
foreign countries. Reinvested earnings comprise the
parent’s part of its foreign affiliates’ earnings that
are neither distributed as dividends by affiliates nor
remitted to their parent, but instead are retained
and reinvested.
3 Finally, intra-company debt trans-
actions are short- and long-term borrowing and
lending of funds between parents and affiliates
(IMF, 1993; OECD, 1996; UNCTAD, 2006). FDI
stocks are accumulated FDI flows, and hence
measure the value of an affiliate’s shares and
reserves (including its retained earnings) attributa-
ble to the parent, plus the net indebtedness of the
affiliate to the parent (UNCTAD, 2006; US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2004).
Figure 1 shows two reasons why FDI figures may
misrepresent actual MNE affiliate activity, and the
two types of resulting mismatches. First, as shown
in Figure 1a, FDI figures ignore the fact that inward
FDI does not necessarily generate inward MNE
affiliate activity. When this is in fact the case, there
will be a mismatch between a country’s inward FDI
figure and its actual inward MNE affiliate activity.
Specifically, the FDI figure will overestimate actual
inward MNE affiliate activity, and will thus require
a negative correction ( X) to accurately reflect that
activity. Second, as shown in Figure 1b, FDI figures
ignore the fact that other factors besides FDI funds
may also contribute to value-adding MNE affiliate
activity. In this case there will also be a mismatch
between the inward FDI figure of a country and its
actual inward MNE affiliate activity, with the FDI
figure now underestimating that activity, and









Figure 1 Reasons why FDI figures may misrepresent value-
adding MNE affiliate activity, and resulting mismatches. (a) Part
of FDI (X) not used to generate affiliate value-added. (b) Omitted
determinants (Y) of affiliate value-added.
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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BETWEEN FDI STOCKS AND ACTUAL
MNE AFFILIATE ACTIVITY
As we have argued in the previous section, FDI
figures may overestimate or underestimate the
true amount of value-adding MNE affiliate activity.
The question is whether the extent of this over-
estimation or underestimation is random, or
whether it varies systematically across host coun-
tries depending on their characteristics. Below we
develop hypotheses on the main host-country
characteristics that are likely to influence that
overestimation or underestimation. Our hypoth-
eses focus on the inward FDI stocks of countries
rather than on their FDI inflows, as FDI stocks
supposedly reflect total inward MNE affiliate activ-
ity, whereas FDI inflows are meant to reflect
changes in activity.
Tax Haven Status
Consider again the possibility outlined in Figure 1a:
inward FDI does not necessarily generate value-
adding MNE affiliate activity in the focal host
country. This is especially likely to be the case with
tax haven countries, for two tax-related reasons.
First, as interest payments are tax deductible, MNE
parents or affiliates located in high-tax countries
can reduce their tax bill by sending funds to their
own holding companies located in tax havens and
then from there lending the funds back to them-
selves (Hines & Rice, 1994).
4 Second, MNEs can
locate financial and intangible assets in a tax haven
to avoid paying tax on them (Lipsey, 2007). In both
cases inward FDI does not generate value-adding
MNE affiliate activity in the tax haven country:
thus inward FDI stocks overestimate that activity.
The overestimation is likely to be less severe or
absent in non-tax-haven countries, where tax-
driven inward FDI is less likely to occur.
Hypothesis 1: The extent to which inward FDI
stocks overestimate actual MNE affiliate activity
will be greater when the host country is a tax
haven.
Locally Raised External Funds
As Figure 1b shows, a second problem with
measuring value-adding MNE affiliate activity by
FDI stocks is that such activity depends not only on
the amount of FDI but also on other factors. One
such factor is the equity and debt that MNE
affiliates can obtain from sources within the host
country (Cantwell, 1992; Borensztein, De Gregorio,
& Lee, 1998). Such locally raised external funds are
not included in FDI stock and flow data (Kogut &
Chang, 1991; Root, 1994), yet the extent to which
MNE affiliates are financed with locally raised
external equity and debt is substantial, and varies
across host countries. Such funds account for 39.6%
of the total financing of US majority-owned affiliates
in developed countries, and for only 30% in devel-
oping countries (Lehmann, Sayek, & Kang, 2004).
Which host-country characteristics determine
the extent to which the value-adding activities
performed by MNE affiliates will be financed with
locally raised external funds rather than with FDI
funds? For one, the level of development of local
financial markets. All else equal, the larger and
more competitive these markets, the lower the cost
of obtaining local funds from external sources, and
hence the greater the incentive for MNE affiliates
to finance their activity with locally raised equity or
debt (Aulakh & Mudambi, 2005; Rajan & Zingales,
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Hence we hypothe-
size that:
Hypothesis 2: The extent to which inward FDI
stocks underestimate actual MNE affiliate activity
in a country will be greater when the host
country’s financial markets are more developed.
Considerable exchange rate volatility may also
induce market-seeking MNEs to finance a greater
part of the value-adding activities of their local
affiliates with locally raised external funds, because
such funds, unlike FDI funds, are recorded in the
same currency as the locally generated revenues
of these affiliates, thus reducing exchange rate risks
(Caves, 1998; Shapiro, 2003).
5 Hence the greater
the volatility of a country’s exchange rate, the more
the inward FDI stock of that country is likely to
underestimate its actual inward MNE affiliate
activity. In other words:
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which inward FDI
stocks underestimate actual MNE affiliate activity
in a country will be greater when that country’s
exchange rate is more volatile.
Affiliate Labor Productivity
In addition to locally raised external funds, another
determinant of MNE affiliate activity that causes
FDI stocks to underestimate such activity is the
average labor productivity of foreign MNE affiliates.
That productivity varies systematically across
host countries due to cross-country differences:
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
4
Journal of International Business Studies(1) in the industries in which foreign MNE affiliates
are active; and (2) in affiliate labor productivity
within a given industry (Braconier, Norback, &
Urba, 2005; Yeaple, 2009). MNE affiliates in some
countries may be active in high-technology indus-
tries where labor productivity is relatively high,
whereas in others they may focus on low-tech, low
labor productivity activities. Affiliate labor produc-
tivity may also vary across countries within a given
industry as a result of cross-country differences in
managerial skills, local technology, and plant and
equipment availability (De Backer & Sleuwagen,
2005). Everything else being equal, the higher the
average labor productivity of foreign MNE affiliates
in a country, the more a given unit of FDI stock in
that country will translate into actual MNE affiliate
activity, and hence the greater the extent to which
the country’s inward FDI stock will underestimate
such activity. In other words:
Hypothesis 4: The extent to which inward FDI
stocks underestimate actual MNE affiliate activity
in a country will be greater when the average




To measure the extent to which FDI stocks in a
country overestimate or underestimate its value-
adding MNE affiliate activity, we need both FDI
stock data and data on value-adding MNE affiliate
activity. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of
the US Department of Commerce publishes a
database entitled US direct investment abroad: Finan-
cial and operating data, which contains aggregated
financial and operating data on US MNE affiliates
located in a large number of host countries.
6 From
this database we took two measures of the value-
adding activity performed by US MNE affiliates in a
host country: total affiliate value-added, and total
affiliate sales. Affiliate sales are annually available for
all non-bank affiliates of non-bank US parents since
1983, and affiliate value-added is annually available
for majority-owned non-bank affiliates of non-bank
US parents since 1994.
7 Affiliate value-added
measures the contributions of foreign affiliates to the gross
domestic product (GDP) of foreign countries. y [It] can be
measured as gross output (sales or receipts and other
operating income plus changes in inventories and work in
progress) minus intermediate inputs (purchased goods and
services). Alternatively, it can be measured as the sum of
the costs incurred (except for intermediate inputs) and the
profits earned in production. The costs fall into four major
categories: compensation of employees, net interest paid,
indirect business taxes, and capital consumption allowance.
(US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004: M-18/M-19)
The BEA uses the latter method to calculate affi-
liate value-added (Mataloni, 2007). According to
Dunning, affiliate value-added is ‘‘the best indicator
of the overall or sectoral economic significance of
MNE activity’’ (1993: 7). It is a better indicator than
affiliate sales, because the latter measures both a
firm’s own value-added and the value of inputs it
purchases from external parties. In addition, value-
added measures the value-added to an economy
during a specific period, whereas some sales in a
given period may represent production from earlier
periods (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004: M-
19). Both affiliate value-added and sales were
corrected for inflation using the annual GDP
deflator reported in the Penn World Tables (Heston,
Summers, & Aten, 2006).
We obtained the US FDI stocks in the countries
for which value-added and sales data were available
from the BEA database US direct investment abroad:
Balance of payments and direct investment position
data, where the stocks are valued at historical
cost. In line with international definitions, the
BEA defines historical cost-based US outward FDI
stocks as
the net book value of US parents’ equity in, and net
outstanding loans to, their foreign affiliates. The position
may be viewed as the US parents’ contribution to the total
assets of their foreign affiliates or as the financing provided
in the form of equity or debt by US parents to their foreign
affiliates. (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004: M-22,
italics added)
That is, ‘‘[f]inancing obtained from other sources,
such as local or third-country borrowing, is
excluded’’ (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2002:
26). Hence, the FDI stocks that we analyze indeed
exclude the funds that US parents and their foreign
affiliates obtain from external sources in the host
country. Since our affiliate value-added and sales
data are available only for non-bank affiliates of
non-bank US parents, we subtracted from the total
US FDI stock in each host country the US FDI stock
in that country’s banking industry. US FDI stocks in
banking were also obtained from the US direct
investment abroad database.
Since so many studies have used FDI stocks as
a proxy for value-adding MNE affiliate activity,
one would expect some systematic relationship
between these stocks, on the one hand, and affiliate
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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examined whether historical-cost-based FDI stock
figures are roughly equal to inflation-corrected
affiliate value-added and sales figures. However,
for most of the host countries and years in our
sample the FDI stock to value-added ratios and the
FDI stock to sales ratios were not even close to 1. If
FDI stocks were a reliable proxy for physical capital
stocks, they should be approximately two to three
times affiliate sales for the majority of country–year
observations, since macroeconomic studies show
the capital-output ratio to be roughly in that range
(Kaldor, 1961; Timmer & van Ark, 2005). This was
also not the case. In fact, FDI stock to sales ratios
vary significantly in our sample, with the highest
ratio being 13.03 for Panama in 1998 and the
smallest 0.04 for Nigeria in 2001. FDI stock to
value-added ratios show similar variation.
We supplemented our FDI stock, affiliate value-
added, and affiliate sales data with data on our
independent variables (obtained from several
sources specified below), resulting in panel data for
50 host countries over a period of 11 years for
affiliate value-added and 21 years for affiliate sales.
The 50 host countries included in our sample are
listed in Table 1, along with the year-averaged values
of our dependent variables, which we discuss next.
Dependent Variables
We followed a two-stage procedure to test our
hypotheses. In stage 1, we constructed two depen-
dent variables. The first measures the country- and
year-specific correction required to fix the mis-
match between the US FDI stock and the value-
added by US affiliates in a specific host country and
year, while the second measures the correction
required to fix the mismatch between US FDI stocks
and US affiliate sales.
We obtained the first dependent variable by
regressing the value-added by US affiliates in
country i and year t on (1) a set of 50 (N) interaction
terms between the US FDI stock in country i and
year t and dummy variables for each country i,
and (2) a set of 10 (T 1) interaction terms between
Table 1 Year-averaged country-specific mismatches between FDI stocks and affiliate value-added and sales
a








Panama 0.553 0.761 Venezuela 0.776 0.874
Guatemala 0.558 0.668 Portugal 0.781 0.756
Saudi Arabia 0.577 0.896 Switzerland 0.794 0.993
Ecuador 0.586 0.719 Nigeria 0.799 0.631
Trinidad and Tobago 0.594 0.686 Thailand 0.803 0.869
Costa Rica 0.616 0.703 Malaysia 0.814 0.886
Luxembourg 0.631 0.716 Sweden 0.815 0.913
Russia 0.639 0.811 Hong Kong 0.823 0.943
India 0.666 0.741 Argentina 0.831 0.895
Egypt 0.681 0.771 Indonesia 0.831 0.875
Barbados 0.685 0.732 Singapore 0.837 0.970
Peru 0.689 0.769 Netherlands 0.837 0.984
Greece 0.703 0.736 Norway 0.859 0.901
Israel 0.715 0.781 Spain 0.861 0.963
Hungary 0.720 0.854 Ireland 0.870 0.907
Czech Republic 0.727 0.842 Mexico 0.875 0.985
South Africa 0.734 0.890 Belgium 0.888 0.992
Finland 0.740 0.598 Brazil 0.899 0.993
Turkey 0.742 0.796 Australia 0.902 0.999
New Zealand 0.745 0.843 Japan 0.920 1.056
Chile 0.747 0.789 Canada 0.925 1.042
Philippines 0.752 0.841 Italy 0.931 1.023
Poland 0.757 0.884 United Kingdom 0.936 1.026
Colombia 0.757 0.855 France 0.949 1.046
Denmark 0.776 0.862 Germany 0.977 1.074
aOECD countries in bold. Tax havens in italics.
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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dummy variables for the years from 1995 to 2004,
using 1994 as the reference year. Formally:
Log value   addedit
¼ biðlog FDIitÞðdummy for country iÞ
þ btðlog FDIitÞðdummy for year t þ 1Þþeit
ð1Þ
Because both the affiliate value-added and FDI
stocks data were skewed, we log transformed them
to obtain a normal distribution. The additional
advantage of estimating Eq. (1) in logs is that our
coefficients become elasticities, and can be inter-
preted as percentage changes. That is, we empiri-
cally estimate the extent to which an x% change in
FDI translates in a y% change in value-added. The
50 bi’s in Eq. (1) measure the host-country-specific
relationships between FDI and value-added in the
reference year 1994. The 10 bt’s measure the extent
to which these relationships change in each of the
remaining years from 1995 to 2004 compared with
this reference year.
We then construct our second-stage dependent
variable as biþbt¼bit, reflecting the country- and
year-specific percentage increase in value-added
that results from an x% increase in the FDI stock
in host country i and year t (compared with the
reference year 1994). Because locally raised external
funds and affiliate labor productivity also contri-
bute to affiliate value-added, but are omitted from
Eq. (1), the bit’s suffer from an omitted variables
bias. In our case, this bias causes the bit’s to become
higher than their ‘‘true’’ values (Cameron & Trivedi,
2005; Wooldridge, 2002). In terms of Figure 1b,
the estimated bit’s incorporate both the actual
impact of FDI on value-added, as well as the
upward correction (þY) induced by the presence
of omitted variables also affecting value-added.
Hence, the higher the extent to which locally
raised external funds and affiliate labor productiv-
ity contribute to affiliate value-added in a given
country and year (i.e., the higher the degree of
underestimation of actual MNE affiliate activity),
the higher the bit for that country–year combina-
tion. Inversely, tax havens tend to combine
relatively high FDI stocks with low levels of
affiliate value-added in Eq. (1), causing the bit’s to
become smaller than their ‘‘true’’ values. In terms of
Figure 1a, the estimated bit’s now incorporate both
the actual impact of FDI on value-added and the
downward correction ( X) induced by the dispro-
portionate amount of FDI into the host country.
Hence countries that are tax havens in year t (i.e.,
countries whose inward FDI stocks overestimate
actual inward MNE affiliate activity) receive rela-
tively low bit values.
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We followed a similar approach to construct a
second dependent variable reflecting the relative
mismatch between US FDI stocks and US foreign
affiliate sales for each host-country–year combina-
tion. Since the affiliate sales data were available for
the period 1983–2004, we included 21 (T 1) rather
than 10 interactions between FDI stocks and year
dummies in the second regression equation. The
correlation between our two dependent variables in
the sample is 0.79.
For a few host countries and years, the BEA
reports data on the current liabilities and long-term
debt of majority-owned non-bank affiliates of
non-bank US parents to persons resident in the
country where the affiliate is located. The log of
this rough indicator of the extent to which US
MNEs rely on locally raised external funds corre-
lates at 0.86 with our logged measure of the
mismatch between FDI stocks and affiliate value-
added, and at 0.82 with our logged measure of
the mismatch between FDI stocks and affiliate sales.
Although these correlations pertain only to the
exclusion of locally raised external debt from FDI
stocks, they do suggest that both of our dependent
variables are reasonably accurate proxies for the
mismatch between FDI stocks and actual MNE
affiliate activity.
Table 1 reports the year-averaged scores of both
dependent variables for all 50 host countries,
ranked according to the year-averaged size of the
mismatch between FDI and value-added. As stated
earlier, countries in which locally raised external
funds and affiliate labor productivity contribute
relatively more to MNE affiliate activity should
receive relatively high scores on both mismatch
variables. This is indeed the case, as OECD
countries with relatively well-developed local
capital markets and relatively productive affiliate
labor generally receive higher scores on both
dependent variables than non-OECD countries.
Tax havens, on the other hand, are expected to
have relatively low scores on both mismatch
measures compared with non-tax havens. This
expectation is only partly supported by the scores
reported in Table 1. Although Panama as a tax
haven indeed has the lowest score on the value-
added-based mismatch measure, several other
countries listed as tax havens, such as Ireland, have
relatively high scores on both mismatch measures,
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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developed capital markets and productive affiliate
labor.
Independent Variables
In stage 2 of our estimation procedure we regressed
our two dependent variables on the following
independent ones:
Tax haven. This dummy variable was coded 1 for
host countries listed as tax havens by Hines and
Rice (1994). Their list has also been used by
Dharmapala and Hines (2009), who state that it
has been remarkably stable over time.
Level of development of local financial markets. We
used four variables as proxies for the level of
development of the financial markets in each host
country:
(1) the size of its stock market;
(2) the size of its debt market;
(3) the level of competition in its banking sector;
and
(4) its interest rate.
In line with studies in financial economics (Levine
& Zervos, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998), we
measure the size of a host country’s stock market
by the ratio of the total value of the shares traded
on that market to the country’s GDP as reported in
Beck, Demirgu ¨c ¸-Kunt, and Levine’s (2001) database.
Similarly, we measure the size of a host country’s
bond market by the ratio of private credit by
deposit money banks and other financial institu-
tions to its GDP (Levine & Zervos, 1998) as reported
in Beck et al.’s (2001) database. Following prior
research on banking (for a review, see Degryse &
Ongena, 2007), we measure the level of competi-
tion in a country’s banking sector by 1 minus its
Herfindahl index of bank concentration. This index
(H) is equal to the sum of the squared market shares
of all banks active in a given country. Formally:





where si is the market share of bank i, and n is the
total number of banks in a country. An index of 0
indicates that the banking sector of country is a
monopoly, whereas values near 1 indicate close to
perfect competition (Tirole, 1988). The Herfindahl
indices were obtained from the Beck et al. (2001)
database. Finally, we enter the annual long-run
(i.e., 10-year) interest rate of each host country
(Grosse & Trevino, 1996; Olibe & Crumbley, 1997)
as reported in IMF’s International financial statistics.
We reverse-coded the interest rates in our regression
models, so that higher values of this variable
indicate that locally raised external debt is less
costly.
Exchange-rate volatility. In line with Campa (1993)
and Globerman and Shapiro (2003), we measure
the volatility of a host country’s currency/US$
exchange rate by the log of the percentage
deviation of this rate from its past 3-year average.
The source for the annual exchange rates is Penn
World Tables (Heston et al., 2006).
Affiliate labor productivity. Since labor productivity
is highly correlated with wage rates (Braconier
et al., 2005), we measure the average labor
productivity of US foreign affiliates in a host
country by the average wage rate of employees of
these affiliates. Following Loree and Guisinger
(1995) and Slangen and Beugelsdijk (2010), that
average wage was obtained by dividing the total
annual employee compensation expenses of US
majority-owned affiliates in a country by their total
number of employees. Both the compensation
expenses and employment figures were obtained
from the BEA database US direct investment abroad:
Financial and operating data.
Method
Modified Wald chi-squared tests for heteroskedas-
ticity in panel datasets indicated that both the first-
stage regression models that we ran to generate our
value-added and sales-based mismatch measures
and the second-stage models in which we regressed
these measures on our key independent variables
contained within-panel heteroskedasticity (po0.05).
Moreover, Wooldridge’s (2002) test for autocorrela-
tion in panel datasets indicated that both these
sets of models also contained first-order autocorre-
lation (po0.05). We therefore estimate them
using FGLS regression analysis, as this statistical
method enables us to correct the standard errors of
the regression coefficients for both heteroskedasti-
city and autocorrelation. Because our second-stage
dependent variables (i.e., our two mismatch
measures) are themselves estimated parameters,
we use their inverse standard errors as weights in
our second-stage regressions in order to avoid
biases in our second-stage regression coefficients
(Saxonhouse, 1976). This implies that estimated
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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weights.
RESULTS
We report in Table 2 the descriptive statistics of all
second-stage variables and their correlations. The
correlation between stock and bond market size is
0.63, indicating that countries with larger stock
markets also have larger bond markets. The size of
both is negatively correlated with local interest
rates (r¼ 0.48 and r¼ 0.68 respectively), suggest-
ing that countries with a larger stock or bond
market have lower interest rates. To check whether
our regression results reported below suffer from
multicollinearity, we inspected the condition
indices of our regression models. All condition
indices were lower than 15, indicating that multi-
collinearity is not a concern (Belsley, Kuh, &
Welsch, 1980).
We show in Table 3 the results of the regression
analyses that we ran to test our hypotheses. Model
1 shows the effects of our independent variables on
the mismatch between FDI stocks and affiliate
value-added, and Model 2 shows the effects of
these variables on the mismatch between FDI stocks
and affiliate sales. Recall that a negative regression
coefficient for a variable implies that a downward
correction is required to correct for the mismatch,
and hence that the variable affects the extent to
which FDI stocks overestimate actual MNE affiliate
activity (cf. Figure 1a). Inversely, a positive regres-
sion coefficient for a variable implies that an
upward correction is needed (owing to the omitted
variables bias), and hence that the variable affects
the extent to which FDI stocks underestimate actual
value-adding MNE affiliate activity (cf. Figure 1b).
Hypothesis 1, stating that FDI stocks overestimate
actual MNE affiliate activity in tax havens relative
to non tax-havens, is supported, as the coefficient
of the tax haven dummy is significantly negative in
both models. Hypothesis 2 states that FDI stocks
will underestimate actual MNE affiliate activity
more in countries with more developed financial
markets. This hypothesis is also supported, as all
four of our proxies for local financial market
development, that is, stock market and bond
market size, bank competition, and the reverse-
coded interest rate, are significantly positive in
both models. Hypothesis 3, proposing that FDI
stocks underestimate MNE affiliate activity more in
countries with more volatile exchange rates,
receives support as well, since the impact of
exchange rate volatility is significantly positive in
both models. Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that the
extent to which FDI stocks underestimate actual
MNE affiliate activity is greater for countries where
affiliate employees are more productive, as indi-
cated by their higher average wage rate. This
hypothesis is also supported, as the regression
coefficient of our proxy for affiliate labor produc-
tivity is significantly positive in both models. In
sum, we find strong support for all four of our
hypotheses.
Sensitivity Analyses
To assess the robustness of the above results,
we performed several follow-up analyses. Table 4
summarizes the outcomes of these analyses. First,
we add country fixed-effects to our second-stage
regression models to exclude the possibility that
the impact of our independent variables on the
mismatch between FDI stocks and actual affiliate
activity is driven by omitted country-specific
factors correlated with our independent variables.
Because the tax haven dummy is time-invariant,
it drops out of our fixed-effects specifications.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations (N¼565)
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Mismatch between FDI stocks and affiliate value-added
a 0.78 0.11 1
2. Mismatch between FDI stocks and affiliate sales
a 0.91 0.11 0.79 1
3. Tax haven 0.14 0.35  0.11 0.02 1
4. Stock market size
a  2.12 1.82 0.51 0.57 0.05 1
5. Bond market size
a  0.55 0.74 0.34 0.49 0.33 0.63 1
6. Bank competition 0.36 0.20 0.06 0.01  0.15  0.26  0.25 1
7. Interest rate
a 2.45 0.72  0.34  0.42  0.30  0.48  0.68  0.12 1
8. Exchange rate volatility
a 1.02 2.11 0.33 0.15 0.31 0.25  0.05 0.08 0.14 1
9. Affiliate labor productivity
a 3.17 0.68 0.46 0.49 0.14 0.41 0.46 0.27  0.50 0.05
aLogged to remove outliers and/or reduce skewness of raw variable.
Note: Pairwise correlations greater than or equal to |0.09| are significant at po0.05 (two-tailed).
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inclusion of country fixed-effects does not substan-
tially affect the effects of our other independents,
the only noteworthy difference being that the
effect of bond market size on our value-added-
based mismatch measure becomes insignificant.
As noted above, and further discussed elsewhere
(Bellak & Cantwell, 1996; Cantwell & Bellak, 1998),
the BEA reports US FDI stocks at historical cost
(i.e., at the costs at the time an investment was
made) rather than at current cost (i.e., at their value
today). Consequently, reported US FDI stocks in
developed countries, where the bulk of US FDI was
made relatively long ago, may be artificially low
compared with those in developing countries,
where most US FDI is more recent, potentially
causing the underestimation of actual MNE affiliate
activity by FDI stocks to be greater in developed
than in developing countries. On the other hand,
the share of joint ventures (JVs) among US affiliates
is greater in developing than in developed coun-
tries. Because the value-added and sales of US
foreign affiliates are not adjusted for the US parent’s
ownership share in the affiliate (US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2004: M-18), whereas the part
of US FDI stocks that stems from equity capital
purchases by US parents is, US FDI stocks in
developing countries may underestimate MNE
affiliate activity more than those in developed
countries.
9 For these two opposing reasons, a
country’s economic development level may be
correlated with our mismatch measures. At the
same time, it may also be correlated with some of
our independent variables, such as a country’s stock
and bond market size, potentially causing their
effects to be spurious. We therefore split our sample
into developed (OECD) countries and developing
(non-OECD) countries, thus creating two subsam-
ples with less variation in host-country economic
development levels. By and large the results of our
subsample analyses, reported in Models 4a, 4b, 5a,
and 5b in Table 4, are consistent with our earlier
findings, although some variables lose their
significance in some models, especially in the
Table 3 Country-specific determinants of the mismatch between US FDI stocks in countries and the value-added and sales by US affiliates
in these countries
a
Independent variable Expected sign Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable: Mismatch





Tax haven    0.037**  0.021*
(0.014) (0.009)
Stock market size + 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Bond market size + 0.011*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
Bank competition + 0.019** 0.016*
(0.007) (0.007)
Interest rate
b + 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
Exchange rate volatility + 0.001** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)






Log likelihood 1358.2 1607.9
aStandard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in parentheses. Inverse standard errors of second-stage dependent
variables used as weights. (Saxonhouse, 1976)
bReverse-coded.
wpo0.1; *po0.05; **po0.01; ***po0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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Tax haven  0.090*** 0.024  0.626***  0.056*** 0.050**  0.617***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.124) (0.016) (0.014) (0.128)
Stock market size 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.046*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.050***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015)
Bond market size 0.004 0.017**  0.005 0.371*** 0.008** 0.013** 0.013** 0.382***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.052) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (00.055)
Bank competition 0.026*** 0.022* 0.036
w 0.184 0.041*** 0.028** 0.030* 0.187
(0.005) (0.010) (0.020) (0.123) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.127)
Interest rate
b 0.023*** 0.009** 0.015*** 0.386*** 0.018*** 0.007* 0.009** 0.396***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.041) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.043)
Exchange rate volatility 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001  0.015
w 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.012
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Affiliate labor productivity 0.020*** 0.048*** 0.014** 0.960*** 0.020*** 0.043*** 0.014** 1.02***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.045) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.049)
Intercept 0.857*** 0.724*** 0.780*** 1.07*** 0.957*** 0.887*** 0.891*** 1.08***
(0.014) (0.028) (0.024) (0.196) (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) (0.212)
N 452 221 231 529 565 282 282 529
Chi-squared 42,913*** 174.8*** 40.4*** 1517.5*** 34,388*** 212.2*** 123.9*** 1371.3***
Log likelihood 1494.9 689.4 714.6  87.8 1900.7 753.0 841.6  94.8
aStandard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in parentheses. Inverse standard errors of second-stage dependent variables used as weights in Models 3–5.
(Saxonhouse, 1976)
bReverse-coded.



























































































snon-OECD subsample with the value-added-based
mismatch measure (Model 5a). The most surprising
result is that the effect of the tax haven dummy
unexpectedly turns significantly positive in the
non-OECD subsample with the sales-based mis-
match measure (Model 5b).
10 Because the effects of
most variables are robust in sign and significance,
(1) the valuation of US FDI stocks at historical
rather than at current costs and (2) the lack of
adjustment of affiliate value-added and sales for US
parent ownership share do not seem to have
affected the results of Table 3.
Finally, we used an alternative second-stage
dependent variable, the Euclidean distance (ED),
to measure the mismatch between FDI stocks and
affiliate value-added and sales. For country i in year
t that distance is given by
EDit ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ




where yit is the US FDI stock in country i and year t,
and xit is the value-added and sales by US foreign
affiliates in country i and year t, respectively. The
correlation between these ED measures and our
earlier regression-based dependent variables is 0.83
(for affiliate value-added) and 0.67 (for affiliate
sales). As shown in Models 6a and 6b of Table 4,
the effects of bank competition and exchange rate
volatility are no longer significant when we use the
two ED measures as dependent variables. The effects
of all other independents, on the other hand, are
robust in sign and significance, corroborating the
reliability of our initial regression-based dependent
variables.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A substantial number of IB researchers have used
the country as their level of analysis, investigating
the cross-country distribution of MNE affiliate
activity, the factors that determine the level of
such activity, and its impact on host countries.
With few exceptions, this macro-level literature has
measured the aggregate amount of value-adding
MNE affiliate activity in host countries by their
inward FDI stocks. Although some authors have
pointed out that such stocks are a noisy measure of
total value-adding MNE affiliate activity (e.g.,
Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Lipsey, 2007), we argue
and show that the problem is considerably more
serious, in that the mismatch between FDI stocks
and actual MNE affiliate activity is not random,
but instead varies systematically across host
countries. We argue that the mismatch is due to
two factors:
(1) FDI into a country does not necessarily result in
value-adding MNE affiliate activity there; and
(2) locally raised external funds and affiliate labor
productivity also contribute to value-adding
MNE affiliate activity.
We hypothesize and show that the extent to which
these factors result in a mismatch between FDI
stocks and affiliate value-added and sales varies
systematically across host countries, depending on
their tax haven status, the size of their stock and
bond markets, the level of competition in their
banking sector, their interest rate, the volatility of
their exchange rate, and the average labor produc-
tivity of the foreign MNE affiliates they host. In
other words, we show that FDI stocks are a biased
measure of actual MNE affiliate activity.
If anything, the average values of our value-added
and sales-based mismatch measures are likely to be
conservative estimates of the extent to which FDI
stocks are a biased measure of foreign MNE affiliate
activity, as we use the US as the home country in
our study. The US has relatively large financial
markets, making it relatively easy for US MNEs to
obtain funds at home, thus giving them relatively
few incentives to finance their value-adding activ-
ities in foreign countries with locally raised external
funds. This suggests that the average mismatch is
likely to be even greater for home countries with
smaller financial markets than the US.
Before we derive the implications of our findings,
we should first emphasize three limitations of
our study. First, we have not developed a model
that fully explains the mismatch between a coun-
try’s inward FDI stock and its actual inward MNE
affiliate activity. We focused on a coherent, yet
limited, set of independent variables, because our
main goal was to show the existence of a host-
country-specific mismatch between FDI stocks and
actual MNE affiliate activity, rather than to identify
all possible predictors of the size of this mismatch.
Future studies could examine whether country-
level variables besides the ones we identified also
influence the extent to which FDI stocks misrepre-
sent actual MNE affiliate activity.
Second, because most studies measuring MNE
affiliate activity by FDI stocks or flows have been at
the country level, we have conducted our empirical
tests at that level as well. However, industry-level
factors may also influence the extent to which FDI
data misrepresent actual MNE affiliate activity
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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affiliates in R&D-intensive industries may experi-
ence more difficulty in obtaining funds from local
capital markets than their counterparts operating in
low R&D industries, because local capital providers
may be reluctant to finance sophisticated R&D
projects that they find too difficult or costly to
evaluate and monitor (Antras, Desai, & Foley,
2007). This kind of affiliate may be forced to turn
to its parent for financing (Hennart, 1994). In such
high-tech industries the mismatch between FDI
stocks and affiliate value-added or sales may there-
fore be less than for low-tech industries. Future
studies could incorporate these and other industry-
level factors in their analyses.
Third, we have used the value-added and sales
by US foreign affiliates as indicators of the actual
amount of economic activity performed by these
affiliates, but value-added and sales are not perfect
measures of such activity either (Lipsey, 2007). For
example, some affiliate sales in a given year may
result from production, and hence economic
activity, undertaken in earlier years (US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2004: M-19). Moreover, MNEs
sometimes artificially increase or decrease the
sales and value-added generated by their foreign
affiliates by manipulating the transfer prices they
pay for inputs purchased from affiliates (Dunning,
1993; Eden, Juarez Valdez, & Li, 2005).
Despite these limitations, our findings have
several important implications for country-level IB
studies that use FDI data to examine the distribu-
tion, determinants, or host-country consequences
of MNE affiliate activity. First of all, our findings
suggest that studies that use FDI stocks to examine
how such activity is distributed across host coun-
tries may reach erroneous conclusions. The fact
that the stock of FDI in country or region X is twice
as large as that in country or region Y does not
necessarily mean that MNE affiliate activity in
country or region X is twice as large as that in
country or region Y, because, as our analyses show,
the extent to which FDI stocks accurately reflect
MNE affiliate activity varies systematically across
countries. It may be that foreign MNEs finance
the majority of their value-adding activities in
country X with FDI funds obtained from their
parents, and the majority of their activities in
country Y with external funds obtained from local
financial markets. Consequently, while the inward
FDI stock of country X may be twice as large as that
of country Y, MNE affiliate activity in country Y
may in fact be equally large as, or even greater than,
that in country X. Similarly, a downward trend in a
country’s FDI stocks does not necessarily indicate
that the country is becoming a less attractive
production or sales location for foreign MNEs. Such
a trend may also indicate that the host country’s
financial markets are improving, leading foreign
MNEs to turn to these markets for a larger
proportion of the funding of the activities of their
local affiliates.
To examine the implications of our findings for
FDI-data-based studies of the determinants of MNE
affiliate activity, we regressed our two mismatch
measures on some of these determinants.
11 We
found that geographic distance, economic size, and
level of economic development are significantly
positively related to both mismatches (po0.01),
whereas cultural distance is significantly negatively
related to them (po0.001). These findings suggest
that the reported effects of these variables in FDI-
data-based regressions may be biased. For instance,
like the negative effect of the tax haven dummy
shown in Table 3, the negative effect of cultural
distance on both mismatches suggests that FDI
stocks overestimate actual MNE affiliate activity to
a greater extent in culturally more distant host
countries. Combined with the fact that cultural
distance usually has a negative effect on MNE
affiliate activity (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010), this
suggests that studies measuring such activity by
FDI stocks may have underestimated that effect.
This may explain why some authors who have
measured MNE affiliate activity by FDI data have
found that cultural distance is non-significant in
some of their models (Loree & Guisinger, 1995;
Sethi et al., 2003). Similarly, it can be shown that
the effects of economic size and level of economic
development in FDI-data-based studies may have
been underestimated, and that the effect of geo-
graphic distance may have been overestimated.
A similar reasoning applies to studies that have
proxied MNE affiliate activity by FDI stocks or flows
to examine how such activity influences various
aspects of host-country development. We found
that at least one of their dependent variables, per
capita GDP growth, is significantly positively
related to our value-added and sales-based mis-
match measures (at po0.001 and po0.1, respec-
tively), indicating that the extent to which inward
FDI stocks underestimate actual inward MNE
affiliate activity is greater for host countries with
higher growth rates. Since FDI figures underesti-
mate MNE affiliate activity more in countries with
higher growth rates, and since such activity may
FDI, a biased measure of MNE activity Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al
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on host-country growth (Beugelsdijk, Smeets, &
Zwinkels, 2008), studies using FDI data may have
underestimated that effect.
To conclude, IB research is interested in the value-
adding activities of firms outside their own country.
The magnitude of these activities is ideally mea-
sured by the value-added generated by these firms
abroad, and reasonably approximated by their
foreign affiliate sales. While FDI flows and stocks
are perfectly appropriate measures of a country’s
inflows and outflows of financial capital, and of
their cumulative size, they are not simply noisy
but are biased measures of the magnitude of the
value-adding activities performed by MNEs abroad.
A number of scholars, including Hejazi (2007),
Rangan (1998), and Slangen and Beugelsdijk
(2010), have shown that it is possible to use other
measures of the aggregate value-adding activity
performed by MNE affiliates in host countries to
ascertain its magnitude, determinants, or impact
on host countries. We believe the time has come for
others in the IB field to follow their lead.
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NOTES
1This possibility was suggested to us by the editor.
2In total we found 44 studies of the cross-country
distribution, country-level determinants, and host-
country consequences of MNE affiliate activity that
have measured that activity by FDI stocks and its
change by FDI flows. A list of these studies is available
from us upon request.
3Hence the term ‘‘FDI’’ is somewhat misleading,
because reinvested affiliate earnings do not involve a
cross-border transfer of capital (Root, 1994). Note that
FDI figures for some countries, such as Denmark,
France, Japan, Spain, Singapore and Thailand, exclude
reinvested earnings.
4UNCTAD (2006: 12) estimates that from 25% up
to 50% of all FDI into China is undertaken by Chinese
firms that are sending back to China funds initially sent
from there to the Virgin Islands and other tax havens.
5As pointed out by an anonymous referee, this
option is available only to affiliates with revenues in
the host market. This was indeed the case for most
US foreign affiliates, with about 65% of their sales
over the 1983–2004 period being local (Beugelsdijk,
Pedersen, & Petersen, 2009; Lehmann et al.,
2004).
6The BEA defines a US foreign affiliate as ‘‘a foreign
business enterprise in which there is US direct
investment; that is, it is a foreign business enterprise
that is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by
one US person to the extent of 10% or more of the
voting securities for an incorporated business enter-
prise or an equivalent interest for an unincorporated
business enterprise’’ (US Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2004: M5-M6).
7The fact that affiliate value-added is available only
for non-bank affiliates in which non-bank US parents
have a majority ownership stake should not pose
serious problems. Data from the 1999 US direct
investment abroad benchmark survey show that
majority-owned non-bank affiliates of non-bank US
parents account for 85.0% of the sales of all non-bank
affiliates of non-bank US parents (US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2004: M-29, Table 7). The percen-
tages for total assets and employment are 87.6%
and 84.2%, respectively, suggesting that the percen-
tage for value-added is likely to be in the same
range.
8A formal econometric presentation of these argu-
ments is available from the authors upon request.
9We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this
point to our attention.
10This unexpected effect is driven by the inclusion
of Hong Kong and Singapore in the non-OECD
subsample. Both of these countries are well-known
tax havens, and at the same time have relatively
high scores on our sales-based mismatch measure
(see Table 1). When we excluded these two countries
from the non-OECD subsample, we obtained the
expected significantly negative coefficient of the
tax haven dummy on the sales-based mismatch
measure.
11In the interests of space, we do not report here the
results of these regressions or the measurement details
of these determinants. They are available from us upon
request.
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